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I.  Introduction 
 
Current federal budget policies are unsustainable.  The long-run projections made by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)1 in June 2011 show the ratio of publicly-held debt-to-GDP, 
which was 40 percent at the end of 2008, rising from 69 percent in 2011 to 187 percent in 2035 
under their Alternative Fiscal Scenario (AFS), which assumes that current federal spending and 
revenue policies will largely continue. Even under CBO’s June 2011 Extended-Baseline 
Scenario, which assumes that all of the 2001-2003 tax cuts expire at the end of 2012, the 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) will no longer be patched, and that Medicare and other health-
related spending will be held to modest growth rates, debt held by the public is projected to rise 
to 84 percent of GDP by 2035. This paper examines whether increases in just the top two or 
three individual income tax rates alone could bring the national debt to a sustainable level. Other 
policies that could contribute to deficit reduction, such as adopting a value-added tax (VAT) or 
spending cuts, are not examined.  
 
This paper focuses on three options that would increase individual income tax rates. All the 
options are assumed to be effective in 2015 and are analyzed against both a Current Law 
Baseline and a Current Policy Baseline. The Current Law Baseline assumes that provisions 
already in law to reduce future spending and increase revenues will remain unchanged. For 
example, the temporary tax cuts enacted in December 2010 are assumed to expire at the end of 
2012 as scheduled, and the temporarily lower AMT exemptions for tax years 2010 and 2011 will 
expire. TPC’s Current Policy Baseline assumes policies currently in effect, including the 2001-
2010 tax cuts, other than temporary payroll tax relief, are permanently extended, and that the 
2011 tax year AMT parameters are extended and indexed to inflation. TPC calculated the tax 
rates required under each option in order to meet a goal of reducing the publicly held debt-to-
GDP ratio to 60 percent under each baseline in 2020, 2025, or 2035.   
 
• Option 1 would increase all individual income tax rates, including the special rates that 
apply to capital gains and dividends. This option provides a basis for comparing the other 
two options.  
 
• Option 2 would increase only the top three individual income tax rates, while leaving 
rates on capital gains and dividends unchanged.  
 
• Option 3 would increase only the top two individual income tax rates, while leaving rates 
on capital gains and dividends unchanged.  
 
The main finding is that increasing the top two or top three individual income tax rates alone 
cannot achieve the debt-to-GDP targets under some of the Current Policy Baseline scenarios. For 
example, under Option 3, even raising the top two individual income tax rates to nearly 100 
percent2, does not produce enough revenue to meet the debt-to-GDP targets in any goal year 
under the Current Policy Baseline. Similarly, Option 2, raising only the top three individual 
                                                 
1 Congressional Budget Office (June 2011). 
2 The top rate was capped at 96.2 percent due to the 3.8 percent tax on “net investment income” passed as part of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and scheduled to take effect in 2013. 
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income tax rates, does not meet the debt-reduction target for 2020 under a Current Policy 
Baseline. Therefore, to achieve the targets under these scenarios, an increase in the top income 
tax rates would need to be combined with spending reductions or other revenue measures. There 
are scenarios in which the debt-reduction targets could be achieved with the following rates:  
 
• Under TPC’s Current Policy Baseline, the top individual income tax rate under Option 1 
would range from 43.6 percent to 45.4 percent, depending on the target year. The top rate 
under Option 2 would range from 89.3 percent (for target year 2035) and 91.8 percent 
(for target year 2025). 
 
• Under the Current Law Baseline, the top individual income tax rate under Option 1 
would range from 43.6 percent to 45.4 percent. The top rate under Option 2 would range 
from 49.4 to 54.1 percent. Under Option 3, the top rate would be 51.7 to 57.7 percent.  
 
II. Baselines and Debt-Reduction Targets 
 
Two baselines are used in this paper to determine the targets for debt reduction. The Current Law 
Baseline assumes provisions in current law that reduce future spending and increase revenues 
will remain unchanged in the future. The second baseline used in the paper, TPC’s Current 
Policy Baseline assumes policies currently in effect continue.  
 
Under both the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines, significant spending cuts, tax 
increases, or both will be required to avert the likelihood of a fiscal crisis at some time in the 
foreseeable future. Spending cuts or other tax changes in a broad debt-reduction plan would 
require smaller increases in the top individual income tax rates. This paper examines three 
options that rely solely on revenue changes to reduce the ratio of publicly held debt-to-GDP to 
60 percent in 2020, 2025, or 2035, starting from either the Current Law Baseline or the Current 
Policy Baseline. The options all would be effective in 2015.  Modeling of the options did not 
account for behavioral responses to the higher rates. If these behavioral responses were taken 
into account, the results would be even further from the debt-reduction goals. 
 
III. Options: Income Tax Rate Increases to Meet Debt-Reduction Targets 
 
Option 1 would increase all statutory individual income tax rates, including the special rates on 
capital gains (and qualified dividends under the Current Policy Baseline), but would not change 
the rates under the AMT or the 3.8 percent surcharge rate on investment income that will apply 
to high-income taxpayers after 2012. Option 2 would increase the top three statutory individual 
income tax rates on ordinary income, but leave unchanged the special rates on capital gains (and 
qualified dividends under the Current Policy Baseline), the rates under the AMT, and the  
3.8 percent surcharge rate on investment income. Option 3 would increase only the top two 
statutory individual income tax rates on ordinary income and, like Option 2, would leave all 
other tax rates unchanged. 
 
Statutory individual income tax rates differ between the two baselines. Under the Current Law 
Baseline, tax rates on ordinary income are 15, 28, 31, 36, and 39.6 percent, the maximum rates 
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on capital gains are 20 percent (10 percent if the gain would otherwise be taxed at 15 percent) for 
property held between one and five years and 18 percent (8 percent if the gain would otherwise 
be taxed at 15 percent) for property held more than five years, and dividends are taxed at 
ordinary income rates.3 Under the Current Policy Baseline, tax rates on ordinary income are 10, 
15, 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent, and the maximum rates on capital gains held at least one year and 
qualified dividends are 15 percent (0 percent if the gain or dividend would otherwise be taxed at 
10 percent or 15 percent). In addition to these differences in rates, there are differences in some 
corresponding taxable income bracket thresholds. Further, the exemption levels for the AMT are 
at pre-2001 law levels and not indexed for inflation in the Current Law Baseline, whereas they 
are at much higher levels and indexed in the Current Policy Baseline. These differences in the 
AMT exemption levels significantly affect both baseline revenues and the amount of revenue 
raised by any given change in regular tax rates.4 
 
The options to increase only the top three5 and top two tax rates on ordinary income cannot 
achieve the debt-reduction targets in some or any of the target years, respectively, under the 
Current Policy Baseline. In the simulations that TPC reports, which assume no behavioral 
response, it capped ordinary income tax rates at 96.2 percent. This rate would make the 
combined statutory income and payroll tax rates on wages, self-employment income, and net 
investment income (except capital gains and dividends) for high-income earners 100 percent, 
taking into account the 2.9 percent Medicare tax and additional surtaxes of 0.9 percent on wages 
and 3.8 percent on “net investment income” of high-income taxpayers enacted in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Effective marginal rates could still exceed 100 
percent due to interactions with other provisions of the income tax. Statutory marginal tax rates 
even approaching 100 percent are completely unrealistic, but are reported here to indicate the 
infeasibility of achieving a high debt-reduction target simply by increasing top individual income 
tax rates. 
 
The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center microsimulation model was used to estimate the tax 
rates on ordinary income in 2015 under each baseline required to meet the debt-reduction targets 
in 2020, 2025, and 2035. For the option to increase all tax rates, the rates on long-term capital 
gains and (under the Current Policy Baseline) qualified dividends were increased by the same 
percentages as the rates on ordinary income. The calculations of all the rates in Table 1 are static, 
meaning they include no behavioral responses to any changes. 
 
Option 1, to increase all rates, would result in a top rate on ordinary income under the Current 
Law Baseline ranging from 43.6 percent to 45.4 percent, and a top rate on capital gains (for gains 
held less than five years by high-income taxpayers) ranging from 25.8 percent to 26.7 percent, 
depending on the target year. For Option 1 under the Current Policy Baseline, the required top 
                                                 
3 The rates for capital gains (and qualified dividends under the Current Policy Baseline) cited here do not include the 
surcharge on capital gains, dividends, and other investment income of 3.8 percent that applies to high-income 
taxpayers. This surcharge is assumed not to be increased under any of the options. 
4 With a lower AMT exemption level, more taxpayers are subject to the AMT and would not be affected by higher 
regular income tax rates until the increase was sufficiently large to move these taxpayers off of the AMT. 
5 Increasing the top three rates under a Current Policy Baseline with a 2025 or 2035 goal did not cause these 
brackets to reach the 96.2 percent cap, but it still led to a top rate of 89.3 to 91.8 percent, extraordinarily high by 
American historical standards (although not unprecedented). 
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rate on ordinary income to reach the debt-reduction targets would range from 53.9 percent to 
59.7 percent and the top rate on capital gains and qualified dividends from 26.9 percent to 29.4 
percent, depending on the target year. Option 2, to increase only the top three tax rates on 
ordinary income, would result in a top rate ranging from 49.4 percent to 54.1 percent under the 
Current Law Baseline, and from 89.3 percent to the capped rate of 96.2 percent under the 
Current Policy Baseline. Option 3, to increase only the top two rates on ordinary income, would 
result in a top rate ranging from 51.7 percent to 57.5 percent under the Current Law Baseline, 
and would be capped at 96.2 percent for all three target years under the Current Policy Baseline. 
To put these rates in historical perspective, the top rate on ordinary income has not been above 
40 percent since 1986, above 50 percent since 1981, or above 90 percent since 1963 (see chart). 
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Under All
Baseline Rates
$0 $60,600 15.0% 16.9% 15.0% 15.0%
$60,600 $146,450 28.0% 31.5% 28.0% 28.0%
$146,450 $223,200 31.0% 34.8% 40.5% 31.0%
$223,200 $398,600 36.0% 40.4% 47.1% 49.6%
$398,600      -- 39.6% 44.5% 51.8% 54.6%
$0 $17,850 10.0% 17.1% 10.0% 10.0%
$17,850 $72,600 15.0% 25.6% 15.0% 15.0%
$72,600 $146,450 25.0% 42.6% 25.0% 25.0%
$146,450 $223,200 28.0% 47.7% 96.2%
1
28.0%
$223,200 $398,600 33.0% 56.3% 96.2%
1
96.2%
1
$398,600      -- 35.0% 59.7% 96.2%
1
96.2%
1
$0 $60,600 15.0% 16.5% 15.0% 15.0%
$60,600 $146,450 28.0% 30.8% 28.0% 28.0%
$146,450 $223,200 31.0% 34.1% 38.7% 31.0%
$223,200 $398,600 36.0% 39.6% 44.9% 47.0%
$398,600      -- 39.6% 43.6% 49.4% 51.7%
$0 $17,850 10.0% 15.7% 10.0% 10.0%
$17,850 $72,600 15.0% 23.5% 15.0% 15.0%
$72,600 $146,450 25.0% 39.2% 25.0% 25.0%
$146,450 $223,200 28.0% 43.9% 73.4% 28.0%
$223,200 $398,600 33.0% 51.7% 86.5% 96.2%
1
$398,600      -- 35.0% 54.8% 91.8% 96.2%
1
$0 $60,600 15.0% 17.2% 15.0% 15.0%
$60,600 $146,450 28.0% 32.1% 28.0% 28.0%
$146,450 $223,200 31.0% 35.5% 42.3% 31.0%
$223,200 $398,600 36.0% 41.3% 49.2% 52.3%
$398,600      -- 39.6% 45.4% 54.1% 57.5%
$0 $17,850 10.0% 15.4% 10.0% 10.0%
$17,850 $72,600 15.0% 23.1% 15.0% 15.0%
$72,600 $146,450 25.0% 38.5% 25.0% 25.0%
$146,450 $223,200 28.0% 43.2% 71.4% 28.0%
$223,200 $398,600 33.0% 50.9% 84.2% 96.2%
1
$398,600      -- 35.0% 53.9% 89.3% 96.2%
1
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (versions 0509-6 and 0509-7).
1 
For these options and targets, the income tax rate was capped at 96.2% (see text)
Rates
C2.  Target year 2035, Current Policy Baseline (Target: 4.1% of GDP in 2015)
A2.  Target Year 2020, Current Policy Baseline (Target: 5.4% of GDP in 2015)
B1.  Target Year 2025, Current Law Baseline (Target: 0.8% of GDP in 2015)
B2.  Target Year 2025, Current Policy Baseline (Target: 4.3% of GDP in 2015)
C1.  Target Year 2035, Current Law Baseline (Target: 1.2% of GDP in 2015)
But Not
Over Over
A1.  Target Year 2020, Current Law Baseline (Target: 1.0% of GDP in 2015)
Under the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines and
Individual Income Tax Rates for Joint Filers in 2015
Table 1
Top Three Top Two
Rates
Taxable Income Option to Increase:
 Tax Rate Options for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Years 2020, 2025 and 2035
Tax Rate (percent)
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Note that taxpayers are likely to adjust their behavior if income tax rates are increased. Even if 
work effort and saving were unaffected, taxpayers would find other ways to reduce reported 
taxable income. These behavioral responses include reduced reporting of taxable income 
(reflecting tax-avoidance responses, such as an increase in deductible forms of consumption and 
a substitution of tax-free fringe benefits for taxable wages), reduced realizations of capital gains, 
and reduced compliance. If such behavioral responses were taken into account, the tax rates 
required to meet the debt-reduction targets would be higher than the rates reported in Table 1, or 
for rates capped at 96.2 percent, far less revenue would be raised than indicated in Table 2 
below. 
 
IV. Effects of the Options 
 
This section analyzes the effects of the options on government revenues, effective marginal tax 
rates, and the distribution of tax burdens. 
 
Government Revenues 
 
Tax rates for each option were set to achieve predetermined debt reduction targets in 2015. As 
discussed above, under the Current Policy Baseline the option to increase the top two income tax 
rates for all three target years and the option to increase the top three rates for target year 2020 
fail to achieve the debt-reduction goals, even at the maximum possible rate of 96.2 percent and 
with no behavioral responses taken into account (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
Provision
Increase All Rates 188.5 150.8 226.2
Increase Top Three Rates 188.5 150.8 226.2
Increase Top Two Rates 188.5 150.8 226.2
Increase All Rates 1,017.9 810.6 772.9
Increase Top Three Rates 979.0
1
810.6 772.9
Increase Top Two Rates 689.6
1
689.6
1
689.6
1
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (versions 0509-6 and 0509-7).
1 
For these options and targets, the income tax rate was capped at 96.2% (see text)
Current Law Baseline
Current Policy Baseline
2025
Table 2
2020 2035
Revenue in 2015 for  
60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year:
($ billions)
for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Years 2020, 2025 and 2035
Revenue Effects of Options in 2015 Under the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines
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Distribution of the Tax Burden 
 
The distributional effects of the three options under both baselines and for each of the three 
target years were estimated using the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center microsimulation 
model.  All distributional estimates are at 2015 levels of income. The incidence assumptions 
underlying the estimates are that individual income taxpayers bear the burden of their individual 
income tax liabilities, households bear the burden of the corporate income tax in proportion to 
their share of (positive) capital income, and workers bear the burden of both the employee and 
employer shares of the payroll tax in proportion to their earnings. 
 
Estimates of the distributional effects in 2015 of the three options are shown by cash income 
percentile under each baseline for target years 2020 (Table 3A), 2025 (Table 3B), and 2035 
(Table 3C). In all tables, distributional effects are expressed as the percentage change in a 
household’s after-tax income. Note that under the Current Policy Baseline, Option 2 does not 
achieve the debt-reduction target for 2020 and Option 3 does not achieve the target for any year, 
so in these cases, the options raise less revenue (impose less total tax burden) than other income 
tax rate increase options. The estimates show that for all three target years and both baselines, all 
of the options are progressive across quintiles, with the options to increase the top three and top 
two income tax rates affecting only the top quintile. 
 
Effects on Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
 
The change in effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) in 2015 on wages and capital gains due to 
the options were estimated using the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center microsimulation 
model. Estimates were made for each option under both baselines and for every target year, for 
wages (Tables 4A through 4C) and capital gains (Tables 5A through 5C). These estimates are 
expressed as percentage-point changes in EMTRs. As in the distributional tables, note that some 
options for increasing the income tax rate under the Current Policy Baseline do not achieve the 
debt-reduction targets because income tax rates were capped at 96.2 percent.  
 
The estimates show that for all three target years and under both baselines, EMTRs on wages are 
increased in the bottom four quintiles by the option to increase all rates, but are essentially 
unaffected by the options to increase only top rates. Not surprisingly, EMTRs on wages in the 
top quintile, and particularly for the top 5 percent, are increased much more by the options to 
increase only the top rates (even when the rate increase is capped) than by the option to increase 
all rates. EMTRs on capital gains only are increased by the option to increase all rates because 
the other options are assumed to apply only to rates on ordinary income. 
 
The options to raise only the top three or top two rates significantly increases EMTRs on wages 
while not achieving the debt-reduction targets. These results lead to the main finding of this 
paper: that increases in top rates alone cannot achieve significant debt reduction. 
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V. Conclusion  
 
This paper examines whether increases in individual income tax rates, specifically the top rates, 
could reduce deficits enough to achieve future debt-to-GDP targets. TPC found that under 
Options 2 and 3, increasing the top three and two income tax rates, respectively, top rates 
approaching 100 percent would not raise enough revenue to meet the debt-to-GDP goal of 60 
percent in some or all of the target years under the Current Policy Baseline. Given these findings, 
TPC determined that raising the top income tax rates would need to be combined with spending 
reductions or other revenue measures to meet debt-reduction goals in the specified target years.  
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Lowest Quintile -0.1 0.0 0.0
Second Quintile -0.6 0.0 0.0
Middle Quintile -1.1 0.0 0.0
Fourth Quintile -1.3 0.0 0.0
Top Quintile -2.5 -3.5 -3.5
All -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
Addendum
80-90 -1.7 -0.2 0.0
90-95 -1.7 -0.6 0.0
95-99 -2.2 -3.3 -2.3
Top 1 Percent -4.0 -8.0 -9.3
Top 0.1 Percent -4.4 -8.7 -10.6
Number on AMT (millions)
2
12.3 22.5 24.5
Lowest Quintile -0.5 0.0 0.0
Second Quintile -2.7 0.0 0.0
Middle Quintile -5.5 0.0 0.0
Fourth Quintile -7.8 -0.1 0.0
Top Quintile -12.9 -17.3 -12.2
All -9.3 -9.0 -6.3
Addendum
80-90 -9.8 -1.6 0.0
90-95 -11.1 -5.2 -0.2
95-99 -11.9 -19.9 -8.3
Top 1 Percent -17.2 -34.7 -31.9
Top 0.1 Percent -18.8 -36.0 -35.3
Number on AMT (millions)
3
0.5 1.7 3.8
2 
The number of AMT taxpayers under the Current Law Baseline is 25.4 million.
3 
The number of AMT taxpayers under the Current Policy Baseline is 6.1 million.
Options
Cash Income Percentile
Table 3A
Distributional Analysis of Options in 2015 Under the Current Law and 
Current Policy Baselines for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2020
(percentage change in after-tax income)
1 
Note that under the Current Policy Baseline these options did not achieve the target 
because income tax rates were capped at 96.2%.
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
Increase Top 
Two Rates
1
Increase All 
Rates
Increase Top 
Three 
Rates
1
Current Law Baseline
Current Policy Baseline
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Lowest Quintile -0.1 0.0 0.0
Second Quintile -0.5 0.0 0.0
Middle Quintile -0.9 0.0 0.0
Fourth Quintile -1.1 0.0 0.0
Top Quintile -2.0 -2.8 -2.8
All -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
Addendum
80-90 -1.4 -0.2 0.0
90-95 -1.3 -0.5 0.0
95-99 -1.7 -2.6 -1.9
Top 1 Percent -3.3 -6.5 -7.5
Top 0.1 Percent -3.6 -7.0 -8.5
Number on AMT (millions)
2
14.0 22.8 24.6
Lowest Quintile -0.4 0.0 0.0
Second Quintile -2.1 0.0 0.0
Middle Quintile -4.4 0.0 0.0
Fourth Quintile -6.3 -0.1 0.0
Top Quintile -10.2 -14.3 -12.2
All -7.4 -7.5 -6.3
Addendum
80-90 -7.9 -1.0 0.0
90-95 -8.8 -3.5 -0.2
95-99 -9.3 -14.5 -8.3
Top 1 Percent -13.7 -31.0 -31.9
Top 0.1 Percent -15.1 -33.1 -35.3
Number on AMT (millions)
3
0.5 1.8 3.8
2 
The number of AMT taxpayers under the Current Law Baseline is 25.4 million.
3 
The number of AMT taxpayers under the Current Policy Baseline is 6.1 million.
Increase Top 
Two Rates
1
Current Policy Baseline
Current Law Baseline
1 
Note that under the Current Policy Baseline this option did not achieve the target because 
income tax rates were capped at 96.2%.
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
Table 3B
Distributional Analysis of Options in 2015 Under the Current Law and 
Current Policy Baselines for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2025
(percentage change in after-tax income)
Cash Income Percentile
Income Tax Options
Increase All 
Rates
Increase Top 
Three Rates
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Lowest Quintile -0.2 0.0 0.0
Second Quintile -0.7 0.0 0.0
Middle Quintile -1.3 0.0 0.0
Fourth Quintile -1.6 0.0 0.0
Top Quintile -3.1 -4.2 -4.2
All -2.2 -2.2 -2.2
Addendum
80-90 -2.1 -0.3 0.0
90-95 -2.1 -0.8 -0.1
95-99 -2.7 -4.0 -2.8
Top 1 Percent -4.8 -9.5 -11.2
Top 0.1 Percent -5.3 -10.4 -12.7
Number on AMT (millions)
2
10.9 22.2 24.4
Lowest Quintile -0.4 0.0 0.0
Second Quintile -2.0 0.0 0.0
Middle Quintile -4.2 0.0 0.0
Fourth Quintile -6.0 -0.1 0.0
Top Quintile -9.8 -13.6 -12.2
All -7.1 -7.1 -6.3
Addendum
80-90 -7.5 -1.0 0.0
90-95 -8.4 -3.3 -0.2
95-99 -8.8 -13.8 -8.3
Top 1 Percent -13.1 -29.5 -31.9
Top 0.1 Percent -14.4 -31.6 -35.3
Number on AMT (millions)
3
0.6 1.8 3.8
2 
The number of AMT taxpayers under the Current Law Baseline is 25.4 million.
3 
The number of AMT taxpayers under the Current Policy Baseline is 6.1 million.
Increase Top 
Two Rates
1
Current Policy Baseline
Current Law Baseline
1 
Note that under the Current Policy Baseline this option did not achieve the target because 
income tax rates were capped at 96.2%.
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
Table 3C
Distributional Analysis of Options in 2015 Under the Current Law and 
Current Policy Baselines for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2035
(percentage change in after-tax income)
Cash Income Percentile
Income Tax Options
Increase All 
Rates
Increase Top 
Three Rates
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Lowest Quintile 20.9 0.9 0.1 0.1 21.8 21.0 21.0
Second Quintile 33.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 35.0 33.2 33.2
Middle Quintile 36.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 38.0 36.2 36.2
Fourth Quintile 40.5 2.2 0.3 0.0 42.7 40.8 40.5
Top Quintile 41.2 4.1 6.2 5.3 45.3 47.4 46.5
All 38.8 3.0 3.1 2.6 41.8 41.9 41.4
Addendum
80-90 39.6 3.6 1.1 0.1 43.2 40.7 39.7
90-95 40.6 2.3 3.1 0.2 42.9 43.7 40.8
95-99 41.7 5.7 11.3 9.7 47.4 53.0 51.4
Top 1 Percent 44.1 5.1 12.4 15.1 49.2 56.5 59.2
Top 0.1 Percent 44.1 5.0 12.4 15.3 49.1 56.5 59.4
Lowest Quintile 17.4 3.4 0.0 0.0 20.8 17.4 17.4
Second Quintile 32.3 8.8 0.0 0.0 41.0 32.3 32.3
Middle Quintile 33.9 12.3 0.0 0.0 46.2 33.9 33.9
Fourth Quintile 35.9 14.2 1.8 0.0 50.0 37.7 35.9
Top Quintile 38.1 19.7 36.2 20.9 57.8 74.3 58.9
All 35.7 15.7 17.7 10.0 51.4 53.4 45.6
Addendum
80-90 38.3 17.4 7.6 0.1 55.6 45.8 38.4
90-95 37.3 17.4 33.7 1.0 54.6 71.0 38.2
95-99 39.2 20.5 58.3 36.8 59.7 97.5 76.1
Top 1 Percent 37.1 25.8 61.6 60.6 62.9 98.7 97.7
Top 0.1 Percent 38.0 24.7 60.6 60.4 62.7 98.6 98.4
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
Current Policy Baseline
Table 4A
Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) and Changes in EMTR on Wages Due to Options in 2015
Under the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2020
(EMTR as a percent or percentage point change in EMTR)
Cash Income Percentile
EMTR on 
Wages 
Under 
Baseline
EMTR on WagesChange in EMTR on Wages
1 
Note that under the Current Policy Baseline these options did not achieve the target because income tax rates were 
capped at 96.2%.
Increase 
All Rates
Increase 
Top Three 
Rates
1
Increase 
Top Two 
Rates
1
Increase 
All Rates
Increase 
Top Three 
Rates
1
Increase 
Top Two 
Rates
1
Current Law Baseline
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Lowest Quintile 20.9 0.7 0.1 0.1 21.6 21.0 21.0
Second Quintile 33.2 1.5 0.0 0.0 34.7 33.2 33.2
Middle Quintile 36.2 1.5 0.0 0.0 37.7 36.2 36.2
Fourth Quintile 40.5 1.8 0.2 0.0 42.3 40.7 40.5
Top Quintile 41.2 3.3 5.0 4.3 44.5 46.2 45.5
All 38.8 2.4 2.5 2.1 41.2 41.3 40.9
Addendum
80-90 39.6 2.9 0.9 0.1 42.5 40.5 39.7
90-95 40.6 1.6 2.4 0.2 42.2 43.0 40.8
95-99 41.7 4.7 9.0 7.8 46.4 50.7 49.5
Top 1 Percent 44.1 4.2 10.1 12.2 48.3 54.2 56.3
Top 0.1 Percent 44.1 4.1 10.0 12.3 48.2 54.1 56.4
Lowest Quintile 17.4 2.7 0.0 0.0 20.1 17.4 17.4
Second Quintile 32.3 7.0 0.0 0.0 39.3 32.3 32.3
Middle Quintile 33.9 9.9 0.0 0.0 43.8 33.9 33.9
Fourth Quintile 35.9 11.4 1.2 0.0 47.2 37.1 35.9
Top Quintile 38.1 15.8 28.8 20.9 53.8 66.9 58.9
All 35.7 12.6 14.0 10.0 48.2 49.7 45.6
Addendum
80-90 38.3 13.9 5.0 0.1 52.2 43.3 38.4
90-95 37.3 13.7 22.2 1.0 50.9 59.4 38.2
95-99 39.2 16.2 45.9 36.8 55.4 85.1 76.1
Top 1 Percent 37.1 21.0 56.8 60.6 58.1 93.9 97.7
Top 0.1 Percent 38.0 19.9 56.2 60.4 57.9 94.2 98.4
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
Change in EMTR on Wages EMTR on Wages
Current Law Baseline
Current Policy Baseline
Table 4B
Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) and Changes in EMTR on Wages Due to Options in 2015
Under the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2025
(EMTR as a percent or percentage point change in EMTR)
Cash Income Percentile
EMTR on 
Wages 
Under 
Baseline
1 
Note that under the Current Policy Baseline this option did not achieve the target because income tax rates were capped 
at 96.2%.
Increase 
All Rates
Increase 
Top Three 
Rates
Increase 
Top Two 
Rates
1
Increase 
All Rates
Increase 
Top Three 
Rates
Increase 
Top Two 
Rates
1
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Lowest Quintile 20.9 1.0 0.1 0.1 21.9 21.0 21.0
Second Quintile 33.2 2.1 0.0 0.0 35.3 33.2 33.2
Middle Quintile 36.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 38.4 36.2 36.2
Fourth Quintile 40.5 2.7 0.3 0.0 43.2 40.8 40.5
Top Quintile 41.2 5.0 7.5 6.4 46.2 48.7 47.6
All 38.8 3.6 3.7 3.1 42.4 42.5 41.9
Addendum
80-90 39.6 4.4 1.3 0.1 44.0 40.9 39.7
90-95 40.6 3.0 3.9 0.3 43.6 44.5 40.9
95-99 41.7 6.7 13.5 11.7 48.4 55.2 53.4
Top 1 Percent 44.1 6.1 14.8 18.1 50.2 58.9 62.2
Top 0.1 Percent 44.1 5.9 14.8 18.2 50.0 58.9 62.3
Lowest Quintile 17.4 2.6 0.0 0.0 20.0 17.4 17.4
Second Quintile 32.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 39.0 32.3 32.3
Middle Quintile 33.9 9.5 0.0 0.0 43.4 33.9 33.9
Fourth Quintile 35.9 10.9 1.2 0.0 46.7 37.0 35.9
Top Quintile 38.1 15.0 27.5 20.9 53.1 65.5 58.9
All 35.7 12.0 13.4 10.0 47.6 49.1 45.6
Addendum
80-90 38.3 13.3 4.8 0.1 51.5 43.1 38.4
90-95 37.3 13.0 21.1 1.0 50.3 58.4 38.2
95-99 39.2 15.4 43.7 36.8 54.6 83.0 76.1
Top 1 Percent 37.1 20.2 54.4 60.6 57.3 91.5 97.7
Top 0.1 Percent 38.0 19.0 53.7 60.4 57.1 91.7 98.4
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
Change in EMTR on Wages EMTR on Wages
Current Law Baseline
Current Policy Baseline
Table 4C
Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) and Changes in EMTR on Wages Due to Options in 2015
Under the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2035
(EMTR as a percent or percentage point change in EMTR)
Cash Income Percentile
EMTR on 
Wages 
Under 
Baseline
1 
Note that under the Current Policy Baseline this option did not achieve the target because income tax rates were capped 
at 96.2%.
Increase 
All Rates
Increase 
Top Three 
Rates
Increase 
Top Two 
Rates
1
Increase 
All Rates
Increase 
Top Three 
Rates
Increase 
Top Two 
Rates
1
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Lowest Quintile 4.9 0.3 5.2
Second Quintile 6.6 0.8 7.4
Middle Quintile 11.5 1.4 12.9
Fourth Quintile 16.0 1.9 17.9
Top Quintile 23.4 2.3 25.7
All 22.6 2.4 25.0
Addendum
80-90 18.7 2.1 20.8
90-95 22.2 1.1 23.3
95-99 24.8 2.2 27.0
Top 1 Percent 23.4 2.5 25.9
Top 0.1 Percent 23.5 2.5 26.0
Lowest Quintile 1.4 0.1 1.5
Second Quintile 1.1 0.3 1.3
Middle Quintile 5.3 3.7 9.0
Fourth Quintile 9.1 6.3 15.4
Top Quintile 17.9 9.7 27.6
All 16.8 9.2 26.0
Addendum
80-90 13.1 8.9 22.1
90-95 14.6 8.7 23.3
95-99 19.9 7.7 27.6
Top 1 Percent 18.1 10.3 28.4
Top 0.1 Percent 18.2 10.4 28.6
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2020
Current Law Baseline
Change in 
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under Option 
to Increase 
All Rates
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under Option 
to Increase 
All Rates
Current Policy Baseline
Table 5A
Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) and Changes in EMTR on Capital Gains
Due to Option in 2015 Under the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines
(EMTR as a percent or percentage point change in EMTR)
Cash Income Percentile
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under 
Baseline
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Lowest Quintile 4.9 0.3 5.2
Second Quintile 6.6 0.6 7.2
Middle Quintile 11.5 1.1 12.6
Fourth Quintile 16.0 1.6 17.6
Top Quintile 23.4 1.9 25.3
All 22.6 1.9 24.5
Addendum
80-90 18.7 1.7 20.4
90-95 22.2 0.8 23.0
95-99 24.8 1.8 26.6
Top 1 Percent 23.4 2.0 25.4
Top 0.1 Percent 23.5 2.0 25.5
Lowest Quintile 1.4 0.1 1.5
Second Quintile 1.1 0.2 1.3
Middle Quintile 5.3 3.0 8.3
Fourth Quintile 9.1 5.1 14.2
Top Quintile 17.9 7.7 25.6
All 16.8 7.3 24.2
Addendum
80-90 13.1 7.2 20.3
90-95 14.6 6.9 21.5
95-99 19.9 5.9 25.8
Top 1 Percent 18.1 8.3 26.3
Top 0.1 Percent 18.2 8.4 26.6
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
Cash Income Percentile
Current Law Baseline
Current Policy Baseline
Table 5B
Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) and Changes in EMTR on Capital Gains
Due to Option in 2015 Under the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines
for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2025
(EMTR as a percent or percentage point change in EMTR)
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under 
Baseline
Change in 
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under Option 
to Increase 
All Rates
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under Option 
to Increase 
All Rates
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Lowest Quintile 4.9 0.4 5.3
Second Quintile 6.6 0.9 7.5
Middle Quintile 11.5 1.7 13.2
Fourth Quintile 16.0 2.3 18.3
Top Quintile 23.4 2.8 26.2
All 22.6 2.8 25.4
Addendum
80-90 18.7 2.6 21.3
90-95 22.2 1.4 23.6
95-99 24.8 2.6 27.4
Top 1 Percent 23.4 3.0 26.4
Top 0.1 Percent 23.5 2.9 26.4
Lowest Quintile 1.4 0.1 1.5
Second Quintile 1.1 0.2 1.3
Middle Quintile 5.3 2.9 8.2
Fourth Quintile 9.1 4.9 13.9
Top Quintile 17.9 7.4 25.2
All 16.8 7.0 23.8
Addendum
80-90 13.1 6.8 20.0
90-95 14.6 6.6 21.2
95-99 19.9 5.6 25.5
Top 1 Percent 18.1 7.9 26.0
Top 0.1 Percent 18.2 8.0 26.2
Source:  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-7).
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under 
Baseline
Current Law Baseline
Current Policy Baseline
Table 5C
Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) and Changes in EMTR on Capital Gains
Due to Option in 2015 Under the Current Law and Current Policy Baselines
for 60% Debt-to-GDP Target Year 2035
(EMTR as a percent or percentage point change in EMTR)
Change in 
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under Option 
to Increase 
All Rates
EMTR on 
Capital Gains 
Under Option 
to Increase 
All RatesCash Income Percentile
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Definitions of Tax Law and TPC Model Terms
6 
 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). A supplemental income tax originally intended to ensure 
that high-income filers do not take undue advantage of tax preferences to reduce or eliminate 
their tax liability. The most common "preference" items, however, are for state and local tax 
deductions, personal exemptions, and miscellaneous itemized deductions-- not items normally 
thought of as preferences or shelters.  Increasingly, this complicated tax applies to middle-
income filers, in part because its exemption was not indexed for inflation and in part because 
Congress did not adjust the AMT to coordinate it with the 2001-2003 (EGTRRA and JGTRRA) 
tax cuts. 
 
Capital Gains. The difference between the purchase and sale price of capital assets net of 
brokers' fees and other costs. Capital gains are generally taxable upon sale (or "realization"). 
Long-term gains, those realized after a year or longer, are taxed at lower rates than short-term 
gains, which are taxed at the same rates as other (“ordinary”) income, such as wages and salaries. 
Taxpayers can deduct up to $3,000 of net losses (losses in excess of gains) each year against 
other income; taxpayers can carry over losses above that amount and deduct them from future 
gains. 
 
Deduction. A reduction in taxable income for certain expenses. Some deductions, such as that 
for contributions to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), are “above the line” meaning they 
are available to all taxpayers with the qualifying expense. Most deductions in the federal income 
tax, such as those for home mortgage interest and state and local taxes, are only available to 
those who itemize deductions. Most taxpayers choose not to itemize and instead claim the 
standard deduction because it provides a greater tax benefit. Because marginal tax rates increase 
with taxable income, deductions benefit high-income more than low-income taxpayers. 
Deductions cannot reduce taxable income below zero. 
 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). A tax bill that 
reduced most tax rates, increased the child tax credit and made much more of it partially 
refundable, expanded tax-free retirement savings, reduced marriage penalties, increased the child 
and dependent care tax credit, and phased out the estate tax. Most provisions were scheduled to 
phase in slowly between 2001 and 2010 and then to expire at the end of 2010, but the expiration 
date has now been extended to the end of 2012.  JGTRRA (see below) accelerated some of the 
EGTRRA tax cuts and added others. 
 
Indexation. Annual adjustments to various parameters in the tax code to account for inflation 
and prevent bracket creep. Since 1981, many features of the federal individual income tax, 
including personal exemptions and tax brackets, have been indexed for inflation based on 
changes in the Consumer Price Index. For instance, with 5 percent inflation, a personal 
exemption of $1,000 would be raised to $1,050. More broadly, the term applies to all efforts to 
adjust measures of income to account for the effects of price inflation. 
 
                                                 
6 The entries, with some updates, are from the TPC Glossary at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-
book/glossary/definitions.cfm. 
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Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA). The 2003 tax act that 
accelerated the phase-in of tax rate reductions scheduled under EGTRRA, reduced the tax rates 
applicable to capital gains and dividends, accelerated increases in the child credit amount, and 
temporarily raised the exemption amounts for the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Most 
provisions were scheduled to expire at the end of 2010, but the expiration date has now been 
extended to the end of 2012.  The temporary increase in the exemption amounts for the AMT 
under JGTRRA have been extended several times and are now scheduled to expire at the end of 
2011. 
 
Marginal Tax Rate. The additional tax that would be paid on an additional dollar of income. It 
is a measure of the effect of the tax system on incentives to work more, save more, and shelter 
more income from tax. Provisions such as the phase out of tax credits can cause marginal tax 
rates to differ from statutory tax rates. 
 
Payroll Taxes. Taxes imposed on employers, employees, or both that are levied on some or all 
of workers' earnings. Employers and employees each pay Social Security (OASDI) taxes equal 
to 6.2 percent of all employee earnings up to a cap ($106,800 in 2010) and Medicare (HI) taxes 
of 1.45 percent on all earnings with no cap. Those taxes are referred to by the names of their 
authorizing acts: FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or SECA (Self-Employment 
Contributions Act), depending on the worker’s employment status. Employers also pay State and 
Federal Unemployment Taxes (SUTA and FUTA) that cover the costs of unemployment 
insurance. 
 
Progressivity. A measure of how tax burdens increase with income. A progressive tax claims a 
proportionately larger share of income from higher-income than from lower-income taxpayers. 
Conversely, a regressive tax takes a larger share of income from lower-income households than 
from higher-income ones. Taxes that claim the same percentage of income from all taxpayers are 
termed "proportional." 
 
Tax Burden. The total cost of taxation borne by a household or individual. The burden includes 
not only the costs of taxes paid directly but also those taxes paid indirectly through lower wages 
or a reduced return on an investment. For example, in addition to the employee portion of payroll 
taxes, a worker may also bear the employer’s share in the form of lower wages or fringe benefits. 
 
Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model. A microsimulation model developed by the Tax 
Policy Center and based on data from the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) public use files. TPC 
uses the model to estimate how proposals would affect revenue, the distribution of tax burdens, 
and incentives to work and save. It is very similar to the models used by the Treasury 
Department, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the Congressional Budget Office. 
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